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Abstract: Enterprise networks are continuously growing up and rising connections 
with various software and systems. Their components’ security is a tremendous 
challenge especially due to their heterogeneity and distributed structure. 
Mechanisms, such as the intrusion detection system, are developed to monitor the 
security level of those components, their exposure to external attacks or internal 
failure, and their compliance to target trust level. Although the concept of trust 
exists for a long time in the computer sciences, it is mainly deployed in the arena 
of peer-to-peer networking and in specific domains like the eCommerce. The paper 
proposes a conceptual trusted incident reaction architecture elaborated firstly based 
on a multi agent system that offers the ability to be dynamic and flexible, and 
secondly based on a decision mechanism that supports the choice of components 
based on contextual attributes and based on information weighted with trust value. 
1 Introduction 
For many years, corporate networks have driven the trends of openness, mobility and 
flexibility. That anabasis in the field of computer network is an open door for many 
technical progressions that have rendered possible a new way of making business never 
imagined before. While that improvement provides many facilities, it also appears to be 
Pandora’s Box for new risks of malicious acts or manipulation problems. The control of 
a network, its extensions and its progression outside the company is made difficult by 
these arising new services. Therefore, the supervision and control of the information 
flow exchange to, and from, significant business functions that it supports are raising a 
continuously growing amount of sophisticated solutions. Intrusion Detection System 
(IDS) mostly contribute to expand that set of products at the origin of security reactions. 
In this paper, we propose a conceptual trust architecture that completes in the first place 
the traditional itemised requirements. E.g.: react quickly and efficiently to any simple 
attacks but also to any complex and distributed ones; ensure homogeneous and smart 
communication between the composing nodes, and be open to a wide range of 
technology. In the second place, this architecture completes our previous responds to the 
following additional requirements dictated by new business constraints [GKF09]: ability 
to make decision on a business based approach, ability to map the solution onto a layered 
based infrastructure, and integration of the concept of trust in the decision processes. The 
paper completes our previous works [IGAB06] by including trust in the decision 
mechanism. This architecture has been defined in a 3 phases approach. The first phase 
defines the architecture [GKF09] using a MAS structure modelled on the XACML 
architecture. The second phase elaborates the decision mechanism supporting that 
architecture. The decision mechanism is elaborated [FKA10] based on the Bayesian 
network (BN) and the influence diagram (ID) [Ya07]. The bigger rectangle is the MAS 
architecture that includes the decision mechanism (shorter rectangle). That last makes 
decision based on contextual constraints and trust value as input and provides utility 
value to the node of the system for output. 
 
Figure 1:  Reaction mechanism architecture 
Whereas the here above described architecture permits to react when an incident occurs, 
it his necessary in parallel to select a language to support the semantic expression of the 
reaction. Rules elicited by this language compose the system security policy as well as 
the reaction policy. In case of an incident reaction, policy adaptation is considered as a 
regulation process. The main steps of the policy regulation process take the business 
rules as input, and map them onto technical policies. These technical policies are 
deployed and instantiated on the infrastructure in order to have an improved state of 
temporary network security stability adapted to the ongoing attack. This policy 
regulation is thereafter achieved by modifying/adding new policy rules to reach a new 
set of stable policies. 
To illustrate the performance of this reaction architecture, we use the results of the 
BARWAN project [BKAB98]. This project focused on enabling truly useful mobile 
networking across an extremely wide variety of real world networks and mobile devices. 
The case study analyzed by the project is a medical application enabled by wide area 
wireless and that exploits the Berkeley InfoPad [TPDB98] pooled computing power to 
permit a small number of workstations to support a large number of end users. Fig.2 
highlights the distribution of the application over the buildings, the campus and the 
metropolitan layers. In that paper, an architecture to adapt a reaction once an attack 
occurs on one of those layers is proposed. Additionally, the architecture makes it 
possible to integrate internal or external contextual information for the reaction decision 
like, e.g. the usage of the application, as proposed in the case study, during a medical 
rescue operation after a serious car accident on the Golden Gate Bridge. The values used 
for the illustration are issued from [FKA10]. 
2 Multi agent System architecture 
The distributed architecture introduced in the paper is composed of several components, 
called operators, which have different responsibilities. Those operators are organized in 
two dimensions, as presented in Fig. 2. The vertical dimension, structured in layers 
relative to the managed network organization, allows adding abstraction in going 
upward: the lowest layer is closed to the managed system and thus plays the role of an 
interface between the targeted network and the management system. The higher layer 
encompasses a global perception of the whole system and is able to take some decisions 
based on a more complete knowledge of the system, business, and organization. 
Intermediate levels (1 to n-1) guarantee flexibility and scalability to the architecture in 
order to consider management constraints of the infrastructure. Those middleware levels 
are optional but allow the system to be better adapted to the complexity of a given 
organization and the size of the information system. 
 
Figure 2:  Overall architecture layers  
The horizontal dimension contains three trees (alert, reaction and deployment) placed 
side by side and composed respectively with the following components: (1) The Alert 
Correlation Engine (ACE) that collects, normalizes, correlates, analyzes the alerts 
coming from the networks and which represent an incident. The confirmed alert is 
forwarded to the reaction decision component. (2) The Police Instantiation Engine (PIE) 
receives the confirmed alert to which a reaction is expected. Considering the knowledge 
of the policy and of the systems’ organization and specified behaviour, these 
components decide if a reaction is needed and they define that reaction. The reaction 
may be a modification, an addition to or a removal of current policy. (3) The Policy 
Deployment Point (PDP) instantiates and deploys the new policies on the targeted 
networks. The deployment is made by the Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) that enforces 
these new policies and lead to a new security stability of the network. The terminology 
used is extracted from both: [Xa00] and [CM03]. Fig. 2. explains how the three layers 
are mapped to the architecture borrowed from [BKAB98]. From top to bottom: the 
metropolitan area, the campus area, and the in building network (building A and B). 
The scientific literature is rich in papers addressing the usage of XACML as a language 
to improve the trust in information sharing [MCCP06], however, it lacks proposals 
concerning the trust between the components of the XACML architecture itself. Despite 
the few existing solutions, [KCEV05] proposes an architecture based on the addition of a 
Security Information Point (SIP) along the existing components to manage the following 
security features: generation of random secret keys for encryption, verification of the 
integrity of access control policies, management of security related information and 
coordination between components. As highlighted in Fig. 3, we complete the SIP with 
the management of the trust between all of the XACML components. The MAS 
architecture is associated with a communication engine. This engine is based on a 
message format and on a message exchange protocol issued by [De07]. The message 
format is defined in XML and structured around a number of attributes that specify the 
message source, the message destination, the level on which the destination trusts the 
source, and the message type (alert, reaction, policy request, policy modification, policy 
modification validation, decision and synchronization). The protocol defines the 
exchange format and the workflow of messages between the architecture components. It 
encompasses a set of rules that governs the syntax, semantics, and synchronization 
communication. Electronic institution based on agents provides the requisite 
characteristics to support the function of the operators. Hence, agents are assigned roles 
in order to specify their function in the architecture and the communication protocol is 
accordingly defined between them. Fig. 3 introduces the developed architecture 
illustrated based on BARWAN. The flow is supposed to begin with an alert detected by 
the IDS, positioned on the InfoPad server. This alert is send to the BuildingA_ACE 
agent that does or does not confirm the alert to the PIE. The decision to confirm the alert 
is explained in section 3. Afterwards, the PIE decides to apply new policies or to forward 
the alert to an ACE from a higher layer. Its PIE agent sends the policies to the PDP 
agent, which decides which PEP is able to implement it in terms of rules or script on 
devices (InfoPad server, fileserver, etc.). Then the PDP agent sends the new policy to the 
InfoPad PEP agent that knows how to transform a policy into an understandable rule or 
script for the InfoPad server. The decisions lay on information issued by the context and 
weighted based on trust values provided by the trust engine. A focused analysis of the 
PDP points out that it is composed of several modules. For the MAS perspective, the 
Component Configuration Mapper results from the interaction between the PDP agent 
and the Facilitator Agent while the Policy Analysis module is achieved by the PDP 
agent. The Facilitator manages the network topology by retrieving PEP agents according 
to their localization (devices registered with IP address or MAC address) or according to 
actions they could apply and their type (router, firewall, file server, etc.). Therefore, the 
Facilitator uses white pages and yellow pages services. The JADE [BPR99] platform 
provides implemented facilitator and searching services. Besides, the use of a MAS 
framework provides flexibility, openness and heterogeneity. Actually, when we decide 
to add a new PEP, we just have to provide its PEP Agent with the ability to concretely 
apply the policies that will register itself through the Facilitator, which will update the 
databases. The main goal of the reaction policy enforcement engine is to apply policies 
in terms of specific concrete rules on “technical” devices (router, firewall, fileserver, and 
other systems named PEP). 
3 Decision Support System 
The system should be able to provide mechanisms to make decisions in a set of 
situations like: conflicts between several choices of reactions or necessities to escalade 
(or not) reactions to the upper layer. One challenge of the DSS is the management of 
uncertainty. Uncertainty is defined as situation caused by a lack of knowledge about the 
environment when agents need to decide the truth of statement. The decision inputs of 
the alert sending are e.g.: the frequency of the alerts, the contribution of the system to the 
medical rescue operation (if any), or the criticality of the rescue operation. The decision 
outputs e.g.: the escalation of the alert to upper ACE. As explained by [Ya07], the 
decision mechanism stands on four pillars: Ontology, BN, ID and Virtual Knowledge 
Community (VKC). In that paper, the VKC is not addressed because the 3 first pillars 
are sufficient to understand the decision mechanism. The preferred approach to design 
the decision mechanism is studied from the research performed by Yang’s thesis and is 
adapted for the incident reaction through a MAS architecture. This paper completes 
Yang’s research since our DSS is illustrated by a real architecture for incident reaction. 
 
Figure 3: MAS reaction architecture 
Ontology is the most import pillar in that it supports the BN and ID pillars. For the 
incident reaction system, ontology is defined using the Web Ontology Language (OWL). 
Resource Development Frameworks (RDF) syntax is the most commonly used method 
to model information in OWL. It may be implemented in web resources and is structured 
based on the set [object, subject, trustValue (objet, subject), predicate]. Object and 
subject are resources, predicate is an attribute or a relation used to describe a resource, 
and trustValue has been added to reflect the trust value that the subject has on the object. 
In BARWAN case study, the DSS decides to transfer an alert from the IDS to the 
BuildingA_ACE, to forward that alert to an upper ACE, and to confirm the alert to the 
PIE. On Fig 4., t [0,1] reflects the trust between the agents that play the role of the 
components or between these agents and data sources. Fig. 4’s data are random for 
illustration. The ontology permits to formalize the concept encompassed in the MAS 
architecture as well as their relations. However, at the ontological level of formalization, 
uncertainty challenge remains unaddressed and decision mechanism remain needed for 
the agents to take the decision. OntoBayes is an extension of OWL with two features: 
BN that address the uncertainty and ID that support the decision mechanism process.  
 
ProbCell    HasPParameters                              HasPValue 
Cell_1 alert.severity=low|rescue.impact=low 0.8 
Cell_2 alert.severity=medium|rescue.impact=low 0.4 
Cell_3 alert.severity=high|rescue.impact=l 0.1 
Cell_4 alert.severity=low|rescue.impact=medium 0.3 
Cell_5 alert.severity=medium|rescue.impact=medium 0.9 
Cell_6 alert.severity=high|rescue.impact=medium 0.5 
Cell_7 alert.severity=low|rescue.impact=h 0.1 
Cell_8 alert.severity=medium|rescue.impact=high 0.4 
Cell_9 alert.severity=high|rescue.impact=high 0.7 
Table 1:  Bayesian probability 
 
Figure 4: Inter components trust values 
The Bayes theorem is used to calculate conditional probabilities. The calculation 
depends on prior knowledge that could be considered as uncertain. E.g.: the probability 
of high impact on the medical rescue if we have a medium severity alert beforehand. The 
BNs extension introduces the parameters of that probability by specifying the following 
two perspectives: qualitative and quantitative. The qualitative perspective specifies the 
random variables explicitly as well as their dependencies and the later links quantitative 
information to those variables using OWL. The specification of random variables and 
their dependency is performed by introducing the new OWL property element 
<owl:ObjectProperty rdf.ID=”dependsOn”/> [Ya07]. Accordingly, the qualitative 
extension may be represented by 2 Bayesian graph models (Fig. 5). The ovals represent 
Bayesian variables and the arrows specify their relations. The graph is to be read, e.g. 1.: 
The alert that is forwarded from the BuildingB_ACE to the network upper ACE has 
influence on the confirmation of the alert that is send from the CampusArea_ACE to the 
CampusArea_PIE. E.g. 2.: The severity of the alert has influence on the action to send an 
alert to the BuildingA_ACE. The last examples may be translated using the new OWL 
dependsOn element as follows: The quantitative extension is performed in association 
with the probability table of the Bayesian variables. In case of the BARWAN, Table 1 
provides the quantitative probability P (Table I). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Bayesian graph models 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: ID’s graph model of alert transfer 
Utility HasUParameters   HasUValue 
Cell_1 send(alert.BuildingA_ACE)=yes|severity.alert=low -80 
Cell_2 send(alert.BuildingA_ACE)=yes|severity.alert=medium 50 
Cell_3 send(alert.BuildingA_ACE)=yes|severity.alert=high 100 
Cell_4 send(alert.BuildingA_ACE)=no|severity.alert=low 80 
Cell_5 send(alert.BuildingA_ACE)=no|severity.alert=medium 40 
Cell_6 send(alert.BuildingA_ACE)=no|severity.alert=high -100 
   
Table 2: Utility for in lan ACE alert sending 
IDs extension aims at representing and analyzing a decisional model to support the 
decision making process. The review of the literature dealing with the issue of ID 
[HM05, Je01] underlines that decision mechanisms are composed by three types of 
nodes: 1) Chance nodes that represent variables, which are not controlled by the decision 
maker, 2) Decision nodes that represent choices available for the decision maker, and 3) 
Utility nodes that represent agent utility functions. Additionally, [TS90] explains that 
three types of arcs express the relationship between the nodes: I) Information arcs 
(isKnownBy) that point out the information that is indispensable for the decision maker, 
II) Conditional arcs (influenceOn) that point out the probabilistic dependency on the 
associated variable, and III) Functional arcs (attributeOf) that point out variables used 
by utility nodes as decision criteria. Based on that structure of a decisional model, the 
alert transfer may be represented in Fig. 6. Ovals stand for Chance nodes, rectangles 
stand for Decision nodes, and diamonds stand for Utility nodes. The information arc 
relates to all information observed to make a decision and the conditional arc relates to 
data issued from Chance node and considered as evidence for the Decision nodes. 
Additionally, to make a decision, the agent that takes the decision needs to have its 
preferences quantified according to a set of attributes. The most important preference has 
the higher value whereas the worst has the lower one. To achieve that, the Utility node is 
associated with a utility table that gathers the preferences for all decision choices. Table 
2 shows these preferences for the BuildingA_ACE alert sending decision and is 
represented by the utility database in Fig. 3. As seen in Fig. 6, a sequential path between 
all decisions exists. Indeed, some decision depends on previous decisions and as a 
consequence, previous decisions (decision node) become chance nodes for next chance 
node. This figure illustrates that send(alert.BuildingA_ACE) is at the same time a 
decision node and a chance node that is known to be the decision node 
alertForward2(BuildingA_ACE,CampusAreaACE). 
The analyze of the DSS shows that, according to the BARWAN case study, the 
probability of having a high impact on the rescue is meaningful (0.7) if the severity of 
the alert is high (Table I, Cell_9). Hence, sending the alert to the BuildingA_ACE when 
the alert severity is high has much utility (Table II, Cell_3). However, in the decision 
process, the trust parameter is also to be taken into account: t=0.1 (for the severity 
parameter). That reflects, E.g. that the severity is often badly evaluated. For others 
parameters like the alert duration, the trust level is higher (t=0.6). As a consequence, if 
we suppose that the impact on the rescue of the alert duration is important, this 
parameter will be more meaningful, to the decision to send the alert to the 
BuildingA_ACE than to the severity. On the contrary, if its impact on the rescue is low, 
its value will accordingly be reduced. The impact of trust in the above paragraph is based 
on two different parameters (severity and duration). Trust is moreover significant for a 
decision based on parameters that provides the same information. E.g., in Fig. 6, the alert 
is confirmed by the CampusArea_ACE to the CampusArea_PIE based on the alert 
forwarded from the BuildingA_ACE (t=0.7) and from the BuildingB_ACE (t=0.6). In 
that case, depending on the configuration of the DSS engine, the decision may be taken 
whether based on the more trusted agent or on the average values weighted by trust. This 
possible to use trust in IDS offers the advantage to refine the decision make by the MAS 
not only regarding the value send by an agent but also based on the context in which the 
agent evaluates or based on the previous data he has provided.  
Although MAS has already been largely investigated in the field of crisis management, 
linking the decision making process with trust values remains to the best of our 
knowledge not significantly addressed.  The review of the research performed in that 
field reveals the plethora of efforts made to enhance the detection of attacks and to 
correlate them with vulnerability databases [La99], to automate the reaction [BP04], and 
to improve their performance [Ja99,AAPM04]. However, research aiming to ensure a 
global reaction to attacks in order to avoid their propagation and/or to help the 
administrator to deploy the appropriate reactions, remains restrained to some very 
specific applications and domains like [RJCM03] that focuses on web services and 
internet servers or [TCGN06] that proposes a protocol named ContagAlert, which is able 
to propagate an alert while an attack is in progress. This protocol uses contagion 
spreading behaviour and is consequently well tailored for wide spread network. The 
inconvenient of it is that the decision for the alert propagation is based on threshold 
behaviour and do not integrate the business constraints in the decision mechanism. 
[IAA06] establishes a connection between the business and the technology but the 
perspective of its analysis rather concerns the value associated with a well thought IDS 
deployment strategy than IDS systems tailoring according to the business services. 
[WFCR01] also proposes a cost benefit analysis for IDS that reflects the business needs 
but does not accordingly parameterized the IDS. Trust and MAS in IDS has been 
recently introduced by [BJGD04] and [RTPP07] under a technical perspective, but in 
those last researches, as well as in the previously depicted, the alignment of a solution 
utility with the business value has been omitted. 
4 Conclusions 
The paper presents a conceptual trusted incident reaction architecture based on a policy 
regulation approach strategy. The solution is composed firstly with a MAS that offers the 
advantage to react quickly and efficiently to an attack while being adapted for 
heterogeneous and distributed networks. Secondly, with a decision support system that 
helps agents to make decisions based on utility preference values and new requirements 
coming along those architectures: the awareness of contextual information and the 
integration trust weighted attributes. The architecture has been illustrated based on 
BARWAN. Accordingly, the decision mechanism has been analyzed for the criticality of 
the medical rescue operations while taking the trust in the IDS component into account. 
Future works focuses on analysing the performance of the architecture.   
This research was funded by the National Research Fund of Luxemburg in the context of 
TITAN (Trust Assurance for Critical Infrastructures in Multi agents Environments, FNR 
CO/08/IS/21) project. 
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